Risk Limiting Audit Center

The audit of the November 5th, 2024 General Election was completed on November 21st. 

Two contests were audited: President Vice President and State Representative 28

The Presidential Audit was conducted using the batch comparison method. The Representative 28 Audit was conducted using the ballot polling method. 

The risk limit for these audits was set at 9%. 

Dice Roll 11-18-24

RLA Video Day 1

RLA Video Day 2

The Board of Elections conducted an audit of the Presidential Preference Primary with a risk limit of 9%.

• The HASH for this manifest is c961ace03280c0ae2c9801838a99f682de27f22c2613d133b21812758afdfeff 
• The HASH for the batch totals is 731c4cf13b07a5165ba92382139df41e01f64896992ce0ceb8acdc0815d2eb51

The links and information below pertain to Minerva version 1.0. The 2022 Minerva Pilot conducted here provided the researchers with additional data for Minerva 1.0 and a first test of Minerva 2.0. When Minerva 2.0 information becomes available, we will link to those papers here.

Filip Zagórski, Grant McClearn, Sarah Morin, Neal McBurnett and Poorvi L. Vora, USENIX Security, 2021. Full version with proofs is: Filip Zagórski, Grant McClearn, Sarah Morin, Neal McBurnett and Poorvi L. Vora,arXiv:2008.02315, first version 5 August 2020. Latest version 21 February, 2021.

Oliver Broadrick, Sarah Morin, Grant McClearn, Neal McBurnett, Poorvi L. Vora and Filip Zagórski, Accepted, Seventh Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting, in association with Financial Cryptography 2022.

Note: Random variations in round sizes do not affect the risk-limiting property of Minerva.

Batch Seed